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Corporate Governance Reform in Germany: 
The Second Decade
PROF. DR. ULRICH NOACK AND DR. DIRK ZETZSCHE, LL.M.*
Notwithstanding one decade of corporate law reform during which the German leg-
islature augmented the traditional explicit system of corporate control with market-
based corporate governance devices, the German corporate governance reform law 
agenda is still packed. The paper provides an overview of the status of corporate 
law making on the verge of early federal elections in Germany in fall 2005. It 
examines the driving forces behind current reforms. It also considers governance-
related issues of securities and accounting law. The authors provide brief comments 
on pending legislative steps and measure the impact of the reforms on the overall 
structure of the German corporate governance system. The paper serves two pur-
poses. On the one hand, it provides an insight into the dynamic development of 
German corporate law under the influence of European, national, and international 
reform agendas. On the other hand, it describes the transition from the traditional 
German explicit system of corporate control to a system in which the legislature 
assigns capital markets a greater share in controlling managers.
I. Introduction
Providing an overview of current corporate governance reforms in Germany offers 
the opportunity to examine two stereotypes. First, Germany is often thought to be 
exemplary of the “old Europe”, ie slow in reforms, and struggling to keep up with 
the pace of international developments. 
Our second point pertains specifically to corporate governance.  Notwithstanding 
the many differences in the details of its definition,1 corporate governance deals 
* Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf/Germany, Faculty of Law, Center for Business & Corporate 
Law (CBC). 
The paper was presented at the Conference on Corporate Governance of the Nordic Law yer Academy 
in Copenhagen, November 12th and 13th, 2004. The authors are grateful for comments and help provided 
by Kathleen Grandy, Michael Beurskens, Jan Schans Christensen, Paul Davies, Ronald Gilson, Jörn 
Isenberg, Jaap Winter, Christopher Wright and by the participants of the conference. 
All websites were visited in spring through summer 2005. The paper deals with the legal situation 
as of 22.07.2005. © Ulrich Noack und Dirk Zetzsche, Düsseldorf and Toronto, 2005. Comments are 
welcome at ulrich.noack@uni-duesseldorf.de or zetzsche@uni-duesseldorf.de. 
1 For example, A Shleifer & R W Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, (1997) J. Fin. 
52, 737, associate with the expression a relatively narrow meaning, holding that it describes legal 
issues related to the problem of how equity investors receive a fair return on their investment in public
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primarily with the problem of how to ensure that corporate directors conduct 
them selves appropriately, and refrain from taking advantage of shareholders’ 
lack of control over the assets of public corporations to the detriment of such 
shareholders.2 Based on a strictly literal understanding, one may think that cor-
porate governance is not a German problem for three reasons. First, the public 
corporation does not prevail in German corporate law practice. Approximately 
1 million limited liability companies (“GmbHs”) are registered in Germany, as 
compared to only approximately 15,000 stock corporations. Of these 15,000 stock 
corporations, merely 833 are listed on regulated markets.3 Thus, private companies 
overwhelmingly constitute the greater proportion of German companies. In private 
companies, the main concerns from a corporate law perspective do not typically 
fall under a definition of corporate governance issues.4 The second reason is that 
German corporations do not have directors. Rather, they either have managers, who 
are responsible for the day-to-day business affairs, or supervisors who sit on the 
supervisory board.5 The third reason is that, in recent years, Germany hardly faced 
corporations; F A Gevurtz, Corporation Law (St. Paul, Minn.: 2000) 179, § 3.1., defines governance 
as “the question of how corporate law allocates power.” 
2 J H Farrar et al, Farrar’s Company Law (Butterworths, London et al – 4th Ed.: 1998) 301; 
KJ Hopt et al (eds) Comparative Corporate Governance (Oxford Univ. Press: 1998) Preface v; J Selig-
man, Corporations: Cases and Materials (Aspen Law & Business, 1995) 133.
3 DAI (ed) Factbook (Frankfurt am Main: 2004) 02-6 (per Oct 2004).
4 The closed corporation is subject to reforms, as well, due to the competition among state leg-
islators to become the “Delaware of Europe.” The competitive environment was developed by the 
European Court of Justice’s decisions in Inspire Art (C 167/01 of 30.09.2003), Überseering (C 208/00 
of 05.11.2002) and Centros (C 212/97 of 09.03.1999), see, eg C Kirchner, R W Painter & W A Kaal, 
‘Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law After Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware’s Product 
for Europe’ (11/2004), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=617681>; T Troeger, ‘Choices of Jurisdic-
tion in European Company Law: Perspectives of European Corporate Governance’, 6 EBOR (2005) 
3; K Schmidt, ‘Verlust der Mitte durch “Inspire Art”?’ (transl. Do we loose the optimal compromise 
in the events following Inspire Art?), 168 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT – ZHR (2004) 493. Specifically, the German legislature intends to reform 
the provisions on capital maintenance and lower the minimum legal capital to 10.000 ¤, in order to 
facilitate access to limited personal liability, with the MindestkapG (transl. Proposal by the Federal 
Government for a law that lowers the minimum legal capital), BT-Drs. 15/5673 online < http://dip.
bundestag.de/btd/15/056/1505673.pdf >; see U Seibert, ‘Entwurf eines Mindestkapitalgesetzes (Mindest-
kapG) – Substanzielle Absenkung des Mindestkapitals’ (transl. MindestkapG – substantial lowering of 
minimum legal capital) BETRIEBSBERATER (2005) 1069 and B Grunewald & U Noack, ‘Zur Zukunft 
des Kapitalsystems der GmbH – Die Ein-Euro-GmbH in Deutschland’ (transl. The future of the legal 
capital in closed corporations – the 1 ¤ closed corporation in Germany) GMBH-RUNDSCHAU (2005) 
189. The MindestkapitalG was expected to come into force per 01.01.2006. On 16.06.2005, however, 
Parliament decided that further consideration of the proposal is necessary. Thus, the law needs to be 
reconsidered, possibly after the next federal elections in September.
5 The two-tier division of function has become increasingly accepted in the Anglo-American world, 
as well. The rules on independent directors are the first step towards two-tier boards: American stock 
exchanges required American corporations to elect a majority of independent directors with specific 
functions: S. 303A of the Listing Manual of the New York Stock Exchange determines that independent 
directors are to sit on the nomination and the compensation committee (as amended per Nov 2003). Even
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problems of corporate governance with respect to large and established companies. 
This was the case, regardless of whether one characterizes these firms as exhibit-
ing patterns of concentrated or dispersed ownership. Consequently, with respect 
to large firms, we have gained some confidence that corporate governance – the 
German way – does work. When, as we will demonstrate below, Germany never-
theless undertakes a plethora of corporate governance reform steps which impact 
large firms, we understand these reforms as a marketing instrument for German 
firms desiring to increase the attractiveness of their shares for international inves-
tors, rather than legislative interventions caused by recent scandals.6
However, this does not mean that Germany did not experience its share of secu-
rities’ fraud during the Tech Bubble of the years 1998 to 2000. Germany differs, 
however, particularly from the United States in that German fraud cases involved 
almost entirely young and small technology- and internet-firms.7 With respect to 
these firms, corporate governance required adjustments, and these adjustments are 
currently being undertaken to an extent that demonstrates – positively speaking – 
the proverbial characteristic of German thoroughness, or – negatively speaking – 
overly activist and hasty governmental policy. 
 Presenting the current steps of corporate governance reform requires, first, a look 
back at the recent history of corporate governance reforms (sub II.). Then, we will 
describe the current reforms (sub III.) before we assess the impact of European 
reform activities on the German corporate governance system in the future (sub 
IV.). 
stricter rules will be adopted by most Canadian regulators through the Proposed Multilateral Policy 
58-201 Effective Corporate Governance and 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices 
(16.01.2004). The second step is the mandatory separation of the position of the Chief Executive Officer 
and the position of the Chairman of the Board. Insofar, Nr. 2.2.3 of the Canadian Proposed Multilateral 
Policy 58-101 is also a step ahead of the American corporate governance rules. On recent develop-
ments with regard to board models see K J Hopt & P C Leyens, ‘Board Models in Europe – Recent 
Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, 
and Italy’ 1 ECFR (2004) 135 et seq.
6 See the Official Reasoning on s. 161 of the Aktiengesetz (transl. German Stock Corporation Law) 
that implements the German Corporate Governance Codex in the Aktiengesetz, see Federal Government, 
BT-Drs. 14/8769 (11.04.2002) 10 & 21. S. 161 of the Aktiengesetz was adopted through the Law on 
Transparency and Publicity in 2002, see infra note 17.
7 See the list of 45 firms that went either bankrupt or were subject to examinations by the Fed-
eral Financial Services Agency, Manager Magazin Online, <www.manager-magazin.de/geld/artikel/
0,2828,186368,00.html>. With regard to that, the proceeding re Deutsche Telekom AG, one of the 
largest German corporations, for overstating the value of real property in its financial statements and 
prospectuses constitutes the exception. For details, see www.dsw-info.de, under the search-expression 
“Deutsche Telekom”.
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II. The First Decade: Allowing Market Forces To Work
A. The Traditional Explicit System of Corporate Control
Traditionally, Germany – and Scandinavian countries as well – provided corpo-
rate governance scholars with a riddle, since, although capital markets with their 
monitoring and pricing effects were institutionally less attractive in Germany as 
compared to Anglo-American countries, managers and controlling shareholders 
did not seem to exploit minority shareholders to the extent that was observed in 
other countries with an industrial structure based on concentrated ownership.8 
From the perspective of a national observer, this characteristic was not surprising, 
since German corporate law contains substitutes for indirect investor monitoring 
through capital markets. In addition to the two-tier board structure, these substi-
tutes include strong shareholder rights in shareholder meetings,9 a specific legal 
regime for majority–minority conflict, called Konzernrecht,10 and creditor repre-
sentation in supervisory boards that augments minority shareholder monitoring.11 
Since these measures require direct investor influence, we will refer to them as 
explicit devices of corporate control. Further, some commentators hold that social 
and ethical restraints,12 or restraints provided by worker representatives in super-
visory boards,13 limited German managers’ and majority holders’ propensity to 
exploit minority shareholders as well. These aspects have been the subject of some 
superficial academic study, and do not constitute our topic.  
B. The Permanent Corporate Law Reform
Ten years ago, Germany had neither a sufficient number of corporations, nor inves-
tors, nor financial institutions, nor rules14 for the existence of viable capital mar-
8 J C Coffee, ‘Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation’ 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2001) 2151, 
at 2158; R Gilson, ‘Complicating the Controlling Shareholder Taxonomy’ (3/2003), online: www.
uni-bocconi.it/doc_mime_view.php?doc_id=24692&doc_seg_id=1; T Nenova, ‘The Value of Corporate 
Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-country Analysis’ (2003) Working Paper, online < http://ssrn.
com/abstract=237809 >; M J Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford University 
Press, New York: 2003), at 168, 189 [Roe, Political Determinants].
9 Eg D A Zetzsche, ‘Shareholder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of Public Corpora-
tions – A Six Country Comparison’ 2 ECFR (2005) 107, early version as CBC Research Paper, online 
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=624241 > [Zetzsche, ‘Shareholder Interaction’], and ‘Explicit and Implicit 
System of Corporate Control’, CBC Research Paper, online <http://ssrn.com/abstract=600722> [Zetzsche, 
‘Explicit and Implicit System’] , at B.III.2.
10 Eg Zetzsche, ‘Explicit and Implicit System’, above note 9, at B.II.2.
11 Eg Roe, Political Determinants, above note 8, at 187.
12 Zetzsche, ‘Explicit and Implicit System’, above note 9, at B.III.1., and “An Ethical Theory of 
Corporate Governance History” (from SSRN).
13 Roe, Political Determinants, above note 8, at 187.
14 Some market-rules dating back to the19th century existed in Germany. These rules, however, 
focused almost entirely on the primary market, rather than the secondary market. In addition, the securi-
ties industry relied on codes of conduct, but many loopholes existed. 
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kets. This paper focuses on the last of these factors, which is held to be particularly 
important for the rise of strong securities market.15 These rules for viable capital 
markets, and thus the preconditions for a market-oriented corporate governance 
regime, have been developed within a decade16 that confronted German corpo-
rate lawyers with more than 10 major legislative measures17 and an uncountable 
number of quasi-legislative steps through enforcement agencies, corporate gover-
nance code committees, private regulators (such as stock exchanges), as well as 
national and European accounting standard setters. The length and intensity of such 
reform prompted commentators to define the situation the “permanent corporate 
law reform”.18 The most important legislative steps of the first decade of the “per-
manent corporate law reform” include: 
• The establishment of a Federal Financial Services Agency [FSA];19
• A significant number of measures that improved Germany’s securities laws on 
the basis of a disclosure approach,20 and
• The German takeover law introduced in 2001.
15 Bernard S. Black, ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets’ 
(2000-2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781.
16 A foreign observer might ask what it was that catalyzed this flurry of legislative activity, and in 
particular, the development of market-based corporate governance devices. Scholars begin to examine 
the remarkable turnaround from an implicit to an explicit corporate governance system, see W Zöllner, 
‘Aktionär und Eigentum’ (transl. Shareholder and Property), DER GESELLSCHAFTER 2004, 5; J N 
Gordon, ‘Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in 
Germany’ (1999) 5 Columb. J. Eur. L. 219, and ‘The international relations wedge in the corporate 
convergence debate’ in J N Gordon/ M Roe (eds) Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004) 161 et seq., and C J Milhaupt (ed.), Global Markets, Domestic 
Institutions (Columbia University Press, 2004) 214 et seq. 
17 Securities Regulation: Gesetz zur Stärkung des Finanzplatzes Deutschland (1. FMFG) of 11.7.1989, 
BGBl. I (1989) 1412; Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz (2. FMFG), of 26.7.1999, BGBl. I (1994) 
1749; Drittes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz (3. FMFG), of 29.3.1998, BGBl. I (1998) 529; Wertpa-
piererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (WpÜG) of 20.12.2001, BGBl. I (2001) 3822; Viertes Finanz-
marktförderungsgesetz (4. FMFG) of 21.6.2002, BGBl. I (2002) 2010. Company and Accounting Law: 
Umwandlungsrechtsbereinigungsgesetz of 28.10.1994, BGBl. I (1994) 3210; Gesetz für kleine Aktieng-
esellschaften und zur Deregulierung des Aktienrechts of 2.8.1994, BGBl. I (1994) 1961; Gesetz zur 
Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG) of 27.4.1998, BGBl. I (1998) 786; 
Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung – NamensAktiengesetz (NaS-
traG) of 18.1.2001, BGBl. I (2001) 125; Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz (TransPuG) of 19.7.2002, 
BGBl. I. (2002) 2681. In addition, the legislature adopted a plethora of minor legislative steps.
18 W Zoellner, ‘Aktienrecht in Permanenz – Was wird aus den Rechten des Aktionärs’ (transl. 
The Permanent Corporate Law Reform – What happens to the rights of shareholders?) DIE AKTIEN-
GESELLSCHAFT (1994) 336; U Seibert, ‘Aktienrechtsreform in “Permanenz”?’ (Transl. Permanent 
Corporate Law Reform?) DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (2002) 417. 
19 First established as “Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Wertpapierwesen“ in 1994/1995, it 
was united with the „Bundesaufsichtsämtern für das Versicherungswesen und das Kredit
wesen“ and renamed into “Bundesaufsichtsamt für Finanzdienstleistungen“ (Federal Agency for Finan-
cial Services) in 2001.
20 See D A Zetzsche, Aktionärsinformation in der börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft (transl.: Share-
holder Information in Public Companies), (Carl-Heymanns-Verlag, Köln: 2005) § 12.
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At the same time, corporate law was modernized in a market friendly way, 
by:
• Strengthening auditor independence and the powers of the supervisory board 
in 1998;
• Reform of the law on shareholder meetings in four legislative steps between 
1994 and 2002,21 which, for example, comprised the weakening of bank influ-
ence in the proxy voting process, and the implementation of rules that permit 
the use of the internet in shareholder meetings;22
• Creating a squeeze-out provision in 2001, and 
• Resolve of the German Corporate Governance Code [GCGC] by the semi-offi-
cial German Corporate Governance Code Commission [Codex Commission] in 
2002.23 
Since the GCGC and the procedure of its enacting exhibit some idiosyncrasies, 
the Code deserves particular attention.24 S. 161 of the Aktiengesetz (German Stock 
Corporation Act) requires listed companies to issue a declaration of conformity as 
to the provisions of the Code on an annual basis. The Code comprises an overview 
of the mandatory corporate and securities law framework, as well as recommenda-
tions, and suggestions. The GCGC is administered by the Codex Commission. The 
Federal Secretary of Justice appoints its 13 members who are managers, academ-
ics and representatives of stakeholders. The Codex Commission will observe the 
development of corporate governance in legislation and practice and will review 
the Code at least once a year for possible adaptation. The government established 
a website as a contact for interested parties’ comments and suggestions. 
 The GCGC fulfils three functions. First, it explains the German law on public 
corporations – the legal framework – to domestic and foreign investors and the 
lay public. This is necessary, since the law for public corporations is regulated 
in various sources with hundreds of sections in the Aktiengesetz, the Handelsge-
setzbuch and many different securities laws and regulations. Second, with respect 
to some issues, the Code requires corporations to comply or explain. Companies 
can deviate from these recommendations, but if they do so, they must disclose the 
21 1994: Gesetz für kleine Aktiengesellschaften; 1998: KonTraG; 2001: NaStraG; 2002: TransPuG, 
see above note 17. 
22 See U Noack, ’Modern communications methods and company law‘, EBLR (1998) 100; U Noack 
& M Beurskens, ’Internet-Influence on Corporate Governance’, 3 EBOR (2002) 129; D Zetzsche, (ed.), 
Die Virtuelle Hauptversammlung (Transl.: The Virtual Shareholder Meeting) (Erich-Schmidt-Verlag, 
Berlin: 2002), and ’Corporate Governance in Cyberspace – A Blueprint for Virtual Shareholder Meet-
ings’, CBC Research Paper, online < http://ssrn.com/abstract=747347 >.
23 For an English translation, recent revisions, and background information, see www.corporate-
governance-code.com.
24 This paper focuses on current reforms. For a topical overview of past reforms in English see 
eg E Nowak, ‘Investor Protection and Capital Market Regulation in Germany’, in: JP Krahnen, 
RH Schmidt (eds), The German Financial System (Oxford University Press, 2004); U Seibert, ‘Corporate 
Governance and the Role of Investment Funds’ 3 German Law Journal (2002) 11; Zetzsche, ‘Explicit 
and Implicit System’, above note 9, at C.III.2.
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deviation in the corporate governance statement which effectively forces the com-
panies to explain the reason for the deviation to investors. Thus, the Code exerts 
some indirect pressure on public corporations to adopt generally accepted corporate 
governance practices,25 and is apparently quite successful in doing so.26 Third, it 
suggests the implementation / use of certain practices in fields of corporate gover-
nance where there is still debate among experts as to what the “best” procedure / 
practice is. Firms can deviate from these suggestions without disclosure.27 
C. The Hybrid Approach
Although the German government initiated the development of strong capital mar-
kets in Germany in the last decade, it is important to note that the recent reforms 
did not strive for a dominant role of a market-based system of corporate control. 
Instead, the legislature pursued a dual purpose strategy. In addition to improving 
corporate governance by strengthening the impact of market forces, the German 
government modernized the traditional explicit system of corporate control, and in 
particular, the law of shareholder meetings. Thus, market forces and direct investor 
influence together create a “hybrid system” in Germany that relies on both implicit 
and explicit corporate governance devices.
III. Current Reforms
A. Macro Factors
While the reforms of the last decade were primarily imposed by Germany’s need 
for stronger securities markets, three factors drive the current corporate governance 
reform.  First, as a measure to improve the European Single Market for financial 
services and products,28 the European legislature intruded into the (traditionally) 
25 For example, Nr.2.3.3: “The company shall … assist the shareholders in the use of proxies. 
The Management Board shall arrange for the appointment of a representative to exercise shareholders’ 
voting rights in accordance with instructions.”
26 According to a study cited by Jaap Winter, notwithstanding the recommended disclosure of the 
remuneration of the individual members of the board of management (see below III.B.1.), almost all 
German corporations fulfil almost all recommendations of the GCGC. While one could assume that this 
is due to lax drafting of the Code, the GCGC provisions are, in fact, relatively detailed as compared 
to, eg, the United Kingdom and the Swiss Corporate Governance Codes. 
27 For example, the Code suggests that the representative (see above note 25) should also be acces-
sible during the General Meeting.
28 The European Commission defined the scope of its corporate governance activities in its 
Financial Services Action Plan as of 11.05.1999, COM(1999)232, online < http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal_market/en/finances/actionplan/actionen.pdf >, and its Corporate Law Action Plan as of 21.05.2003, 
online <  http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/index.htm >. With
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national domain of corporate governance. In doing so, it was underpinned by the 
occurrence of some widely-discussed scandals.29 Second, international develop-
ments, especially in the United States, required adjustments of the national rules. 
Finally, regulators implemented the proposals of the influential German Govern-
ment Commission on Corporate Governance from 2001.30 The German federal 
government translated these proposals into a “Ten-Step Program for Corporate 
Integrity and Investor Protection,” [Ten-Step Program]31 from which most of the 
current reform steps follow. This Ten-Step Program is rooted in the belief that 
investor confidence and thus German capital markets can be made stronger through 
increased transparency, denser control of corporations, and stricter criminal and 
civil liability for issuers and individuals who engage in misconduct. 
B. The Proposals
1. Corporate Law
In corporate law, the legislature adopted the rules for the European Company 
[So cietas Europea – SE], a supra-national corporate form that is based on European 
law.32 Despite its adoption, the Law on the European Company 33 might impact 
the German corporate landscape more severely than the legislature might have 
intended: Under the European Directive, a SE may be incorporated as a firm with 
either a two-tier or a one-tier board structure. More precisely, the SE scheme estab-
lishes a one-tier board system, but provides for a clear division of functions across 
the board members to the extent that it eventually enables a two-tier board system. 
In this respect, the European Company regime provides more flexibility than the 
respect to that, see K Lannoo & A Khachaturyan, ‘Reform of Corporate Governance in the EU’ 5 
EBOR (2004) 37, 38.
29 European investors associate corporate misbehavior with firms such as Ahold, Vivendi, Parmalat, 
and Royal Dutch/Shell. These scandals that became publicly known after the European Commission 
suggested its Financial Markets Action Plan kickstarted the European Commission’s Corporate Law 
Action Plan. For details, see infra IV.
30 See T Baums (ed) Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance (transl. Report 
of the Government’s Commission on Corporate Governance), (Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln: 2001), 
with English translation in T Baums, “Company Law Reform in Germany”, online <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=329962> [Baums, “Report”]. 
31 Federal Secretaries of Justice and Finance, 10-Punkte-Programm der Bundesregierung zur Ver-
besserung der Unternehmensintegrität und des Anlegerschutzes, 25.02.2003, online <www.bmj.bund.
de/enid/fa8a71ef4a25638be7ee184cc9d06cdd,0/ai.html>.
32 The European Company framework will allow companies incorporated in different Member 
States to merge or form a holding company or joint subsidiary, while avoiding the legal and practical 
constraints arising from the existence of 25 different legal systems. The European Company framework 
comprises the Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company 2157/2001/EC (08.10.2001) 
OJ 2001 L 294, and the Council Directive complementing the Statute for a European Company with 
regard to the involvement of employees in the European company 2001/86/EC (08.10.2001) OJ 2001 
L 294. 
33 Gesetz zur Einführung der Europäischen Gesellschaft (SEEG) of 28.12.2004, BGBl. I (2004) 
3675.
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German Aktiengesetz under which a two-tier board structure is mandatory. This is 
one of the aspects which prompted a discussion34 as to whether the German law 
on worker codetermination in corporations can still be maintained in its traditional 
form. We will address this issue more in detail below.35
In contrast, the UMAG36 strives to improve the governance system of corpora-
tions. UMAG stands for the long title “Law on the Improvement of Corporate Integ-
rity and on the Modernization of the Regime governing Decision-Directed Suits.” 
It amends the German Aktiengesetz with respect to three crucial areas of corporate 
governance. These are (1) Liability of corporate managers; (2) Shareholder meet-
ings; and (3) Contest of shareholder meeting decisions.
(1) The first area regards the liability of corporate managers. Though the duties 
of loyalty and care that are imposed on managers are essentially comparable to 
those of officers in other European and North-American countries,37 German cor-
porations rarely hold managers liable for breach of their duties. Presently, the 
Aktiengesetz assigns the right to sue managers for damages to the corporation gen-
erally to the supervisory board.38 The supervisory board rarely exercises this right 
since the negative impact on the corporate reputation often outweighs the financial 
benefit of a lengthy suit against a (former) manager of the corporation. However, 
the shareholder meeting, or a minority holding 10 percent of the nominal capital, 
may demand that a suit be filed against the managers.39 Further, these entities may 
apply to court for the appointment of an “independent representative” who files 
the suit against the managers on behalf of the company.40 Pursuant to s. 147 (4) 
of the Aktiengesetz, if the company loses in court it may recover its expenses from 
the shareholders who induced the suit in the first place. Shareholders who have 
either a majority in the meeting or 10 percent of the nominal capital tend to be 
represented in the supervisory board. In order to avoid the cost risk to themselves 
and the reputational damage to the firm (and, consequently, their stake in the firm), 
influential shareholders usually push for a quiet settlement between the manager 
and the supervisory board. Consequently, bad managers had good chances to leave 
German management boards unharmed and with retirement benefits.
34 On 26.05.2004, the German Bundestag (Federal Parliament) in which the Socialdemocrats and 
the Green Party currently hold the majority, adopted the Law introducing the European Company. The 
opposition, which held the majority in the Bundesrat (Federal Council), delayed the adoption of the 
law through a veto of the Bundesrat on 26.11.2004.
35 See infra, sub. IV A.
36 BR-Drs. 454/05, online: http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/portal/WWW/Webmaster/GB_I/I.4/
Dokumentenarchiv/dokument.php?k=BBD454/05.
37 See, in particular, the Federal Court’s decision in ARAG/Garmenbeck, judgement of 21.04.1997 
– II ZR 175/95, BGHZ 135, 244 = NJW 1997, 1926, acknowledging inter alia the business judgment 
rule. (The UMAG also seeks to codify the business judgement rule in s. 93 (1) sentence 2 of the 
Aktiengesetz.)
38 S. 112 of the Aktiengesetz.
39 S. 147 (1) of the Aktiengesetz.
40 S. 147 (2) of the Aktiengesetz. 
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Comparative studies hold that the safeguard for German managers with respect 
to shareholder suits is rare among countries with advanced corporate laws and 
strong capital markets.41 However, in seeking to fill this gap, the Federal Gov-
ernment also aimed to avoid a lawyer-driven stream of corporate litigation with 
doubtful benefits for shareholders, as – for example – studies show exists in the 
United States.42 Thus, the UMAG gives a minority holding 1 percent of the over-
all shares or ¤ 100,000 in nominal capital the right to induce a pre-procedure for 
shareholder suits. In this pre-procedure, the court will allow for direct shareholder 
litigation on behalf of the company, similar to Anglo-American derivative suits, 
if the shareholders fulfil certain conditions that should function as an obstacle 
to strike suits.43 Moreover, the UMAG abolishes the cost provision that yet puts 
minority shareholders at a disadvantage. 
In order to further facilitate shareholder activism, the UMAG implements a spe-
cial section in the electronic version of the Federal Bulletin44 as a means of reduc-
ing shareholders’ collective action problems.45 In this special section shareholders 
may give notice of their intent to induce the above pre-procedure for a particular 
shareholder suit, initiate a special investigation of certain managerial conduct, pro-
pose a vote on a specific issue in shareholder meetings, or call a shareholder meet-
ing on behalf of the corporation. As far as we know, this institution is unique. We 
think that, in fact, the use of the internet is likely to constitute the best approach 
in addressing the perennial issue of rational apathy, and particularly, in an interna-
tional context. If the institution proves itself to be successful, we would like to see 
the scope of this instrument extended to all shareholder minority rights.
(2) At the same time, this special section is also related to the second core issue 
of the UMAG, which is the procedure of shareholder meetings. This is due to the 
41 T Baums & K E Scott, ‘Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the 
United States and Germany’ (November 2003) European Corporate Governance Institute (ecgi) Law 
Working Paper No. 17/2003, http://www.ssrn.com/link/ECGI-Law.html, at 18-19. 
42 R Romano, ‘The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?’ 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. (1991) 
55, 84; R B Thompson & R S Thomas, ‘The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented 
Class Actions’ 57 Vand. L.R. 133 (2004).
43 S. 148 of the Aktiengesetz (UMAG) requires that (1) the shareholders who intend to sue bought 
the shares at some point in time before they received knowledge about the inappropriate managerial 
conduct in question; (2) the shareholders tried to induce the supervisory board to sue the officers before 
they apply to court; (3) facts indicate a serious breach of managerial duties which caused damage to 
the corporation; (4) from the perspective of the corporation, there are no better reasons for abstaining 
from suing the officers. These strict measures substitute for higher thresholds that were demanded by 
the Federal Council.
44 S. 127a of the Aktiengesetz (UMAG). The website section will be accessible online: < www.
e-bundesanzeiger.de >. 
45 On collective action problems with respect to shareholder suits, see E M Iacobucci & K E Davis 
‘Reconciling Derivative Claims and the Oppression Remedy’ 12 S.C.L.R. (2000) 87, at 114 et seq.; on 
the theory of collective action problems, see K Holzinger, ‘The Problems of Collective Action: A New 
Approach’ MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2003/2, online <http://ssrn.com/abstract=399140>.
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fact that shareholders may use this section to make proposals and attempting to 
garner support from other shareholders.46 
Another issue related to the procedure of shareholder meetings is the reform of 
the identification and authorization of shareholders for their meetings.47 This aspect 
of the UMAG affects companies which issue bearer shares, hence approximately 
90% of all German public corporations. The UMAG removes the expression Hin-
terlegung from the current provision pertaining to shareholder identification and 
authorization. Literally translated, the expression Hinterlegung refers to the deposit 
(of the original share certificate). With the transition from the principle that a share 
certificate represents one share to so called “global share certificates”, which cer-
tify the ownership of more than one up to all shares of an issuer, the meaning of 
Hinterlegung has changed. Today, Hinterlegung describes the certification of the 
ownership of shares by the depository bank that holds the shareholder’s account.48 
In detail, it describes a process that the European Expert Group on Cross-Border 
Voting termed “reconciliation”49 – a method to identify shareholders by reconciling 
all share transactions right up to the date of, or a cut-off date shortly (a few hours) 
in advance of, the shareholder meeting. 
However, some foreign investors (and banks) falsely assumed that Hinterlegung 
implies the “blocking of shares”, and, thus, refrained from exercising their voting 
rights. Thus, the UMAG replaces the reconciliation-system by a record date system, 
meaning that only those who are shareholders at the relevant record date are entitled 
to exercise their shareholder rights in the meeting. The mandatory record date is at 
the beginning of the 21st day prior to the meeting. 
This system change shifted the weight from the bottom to the top of the proce-
dure of shareholder meetings. Yet, in contrast to the U.S.A., the dates for share-
holder information and shareholder authentication are not harmonized. Instead, 
depository banks are obliged to forward any voting-related information to their 
clients, at a maximum of four and at a minimum of two weeks prior to the share-
holder meeting,50 while authentication takes places very shortly before the meeting. 
46 For details on this function of the shareholder forum see Zetzsche, ‘Shareholder Interaction’, 
above note 9, at C.III.1. 
47 S. 123 (2) – (4) of the Aktiengesetz. On the implications of the recent reforms, see S Simon & 
D A Zetzsche, ‘Aktionärslegitimation und Satzungsgestaltung – Überlegungen zu § 123 AktG i.d.F. 
des UMAG –’ (transl.: Designing the Articles of Association for shareholder identification – consid-
erations with regard to § 123 of the Stock Corporation Act after the UMAG) NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT – NZG (2005) 369.
48 See U Noack & D A Zetzsche, ‘Die Legitimation des Aktionärs’ (transl: The Identification of 
Shareholders), DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (2002) 651, and ‘Aktionärslegitimation bei sammelver-
wahrten Inhaberaktien’ (transl.: The Identification of Shareholders of Companies Issuing Bearer Shares 
held in Custody of a Central Depository System), WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN (2004) 1. 
49 Expert Group on Cross-Border Voting in Europe, “CROSS-BORDER VOTING IN EUROPE 
– Final report of the Expert Group on Cross-Border Voting in Europe” (Aug 2002), online: < http://www.
jura.uni-duesseldorf.de/dozenten/noack/texte/normen/amsterdam/final.htm >, 5.3. 
50 See s. 125 (2) No. 3 and s. 128 of the Aktiengesetz and AGB Sonderbedingungen für Wertpapiere 
(transl. Generally applicable contractual terms for financial intermediaries with regard to securities 
trading and depository business).
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This system requires more than one delivery of information from depository banks 
to their customers, and forces companies to spend significant resources for secur-
ing the shareholder authentication. In the future, only one delivery on the 21st day 
before the meeting will be necessary; this delivery will contain both the shareholder 
information and the authentication certificate. 
Since all information may be transmitted electronically, the current reforms 
facilitate cross-border electronic voting in absentia, as required by the OECD prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance.51
The third element regarding shareholder meetings is a push for a cut back of 
the overly formalistic understanding of the exercise of the information rights that 
shareholders have in Germany. Presently, an individual shareholder may ask any 
question that is related to the topics that the meeting is called to vote upon,52 and 
management must answer these questions. Failure to fully answer such questions 
may lead to shareholder suits, the outcome of which may be that decisions of the 
meeting are declared to be void. This right gives German shareholders very broad 
powers in exercising their information rights. The individual information right was 
abused in recent years by shareholders who used it as the basis for bringing strike 
suits. Thus, the UMAG introduces a provision pursuant to which any information 
that is published on the corporate website is considered to be given in the share-
holder meeting. In light of this provision, corporations may significantly reduce 
their efforts in answering questions in shareholder meetings by year-long diligent 
disclosure on their corporate websites. Further, the UMAG clarifies53 that the failure 
to provide information which a reasonable shareholder would not consider to be 
relevant for his voting decision, does not justify a shareholder suit against meeting 
decisions.54 Moreover, s. 243 (4) Aktiengesetz (UMAG) also prevents sharehold-
ers to bring suits for lack of disclosure regarding information on the value of the 
corporation or some of its subsidiaries if these matters can be settled in a specific 
opposition procedure  (Spruchverfahren). The last exclusionary reason is particu-
larly relevant in the context of squeeze outs and fundamental changes the validity 
of which were yet frequently threatened by strike suitors.
(3) Finally, the UMAG addresses the provisions on shareholder meeting deci-
sion-directed shareholder suits to avoid strike suits. Decision-directed suits are 
share holder suits that aim to declare shareholder meeting decisions void on the 
ground that the decision violated either a statutory provision or a provision of 
51 OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance 2004, at II.C.4., online www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/
18/31557724.pdf .
52 Pursuant to s. 131 of the Aktiengesetz. Though section (3) of that provision accounts for certain 
exceptions to this wide claim, esp. if the answer may harm the corporation, courts tend to construe s. 
131 Aktiengesetz very strictly.
53 The Federal Court adopted this test in its decisions of 29.11.1982 – II ZR 88/81, BGHZ 86, 1, 
22 and 19.6.1995 – II ZR 58/94-2, DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (1995) 462.
54 S. 243 (4) of the Aktiengesetz (UMAG).
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the Articles of Association.55 This suit is part of the traditional German concept 
which per ceives the individual shareholder to be the watchdog of management, the 
supervisory board, and majority shareholders.56 The effectiveness of the watchdog 
function, however, became doubtful due to strike suits by professional plaintiffs, 
who forced management into costly settlements. The risk is greatly increased, as the 
filing of a decision-directed suit may prevent the implementation of a shareholder 
meeting’s decision. Court procedures can take up to three to four years until the 
German Federal Court decides the case. Thus, managers often prefer to share the 
gains of the proposed measures (contained in the meeting decision) with strike 
suit claimants rather than delay the implementation of the measure itself through 
a long-term court procedure. 
The UMAG seeks to solve the strike suit problem for crucial issues of share-
holder consent. It imposes a preliminary procedure57 by which Regional Courts 
(Landgerichte) decide whether management may pursue the measure itself within 
4 months after the meeting.58 If a Regional Court allows the implementation of the 
measure, the final court decision will only be relevant for damage claim amounts.59 
Moreover, any settlement must be published.60 Thus, there is some hope that the 
UMAG mitigates incentives for both suit claimants and managers to strive for shady 
settlements to the detriment of the shareholder body.
While specific disclosure of each manager’s salary is apparently common in 
other European countries, German accounting law traditionally requires only the 
remuneration of the board as such. Thus, the Law on the Disclosure of  Members 
of the Board of Management [VorstOG]61 requires companies to disclose the remu-
neration that each member of the board of management achieves individually. The 
55 S. 243 (1) of the Aktiengesetz.
56 Above II.1.
57 The rules of this preliminary procedure were tested for almost ten years with respect to the trans-
formation of a stock corporation into another corporate form (eg into a limited liability corporation) 
with overall positive results. See ss. 207 et seq. of the Umwandlungsgesetz (“Restructuring Law”). 
58 1 month (term for filing the suit) according to s. 246 (1) of the Aktiengesetz (UMAG) and 3 
months (for court procedures) according to s. 246a (3) of the Aktiengesetz (UMAG). Further delay 
may result from appeals (6 months according to commentators: compare H Dieckmann & D Leuering, 
“Der Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung der Anfech-
tungsklage” (transl. The Federal Secretary of Justice’s UMAG Draft) NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (2004) 253-254.
59 If the court of first instance (in the preliminary proceeding) holds that the measure may take 
place and the main court eventually finds the measure to be illegal, the claimants may be reimbursed 
for their damages. The measure itself, however, will nevertheless be deemed to be legal by the force 
of the preliminary judgment, s. 246a (4) of the Aktiengesetz (UMAG).
60 Ss. 248a, 149 of the Aktiengesetz (UMAG).
61 BR-Drs. 451/05 und 398/05, online: http://www.bundesrat.de/coremedia/generator/Inhalt/
Druck sachen/2005/0398_2D05,property=Dokument.pdf; the VorstOG amends ss. 285, 286, 289, 314, 315, 
334 of the Handelsgesetzbuch (transl.: Commercial Code), which regulates parts of German accounting 
law applicable to public corporations.
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Federal Government decided to intervene, because most public German firms 
refrained from disclosure – similarly uniform as most firms comply with regard to 
the other recommendations – despite the fact that the GCGC had recommended an 
individual disclosure of the remuneration of each manager. Two side-issues frame 
the VorstOG. First, it is particularly detailed with regard to severence payments – a 
side-aspect emerging from the spectacular examples provided by Mannesmann AG 
and Metallgesellschaft AG. Further, the shareholders’ majority of 75% of the shares 
represented in the meeting may renounce the obligation to individually disclose 
managers’ emoluments. 
We are unsure whether the VorstOG, in fact, strengthens shareholder rights. 
Yet, shareholders could easily estimate the salary of each manager from the total 
remuneration given to the board. This was particularly the case, given that a cer-
tain distribution scheme is commonly applied.62 This practice is typical for Ger-
man law which generally mandates collegial responsibility of the members of the 
board of management for all actions taken by other board members. Consequently, 
shareholders are essentially as well informed as before the VorstOG was adopted. 
The provisions requiring disclosure by third parties – an issue that is relevant in 
corporate groups – also bring few improvements, since the controlling shareholder 
may waive the disclosure obligation if he holds 75% of the votes in the shareholder 
meeting (which is often the case). While benefits are thus unclear, the VorstOG, 
however, clearly increases the number of provisions applicable to public firms and, 
hence, the disclosure costs for these firms.63
2. Securities Law
While the corporate law reform steps merely strive for the adjustment of procedural 
provisions, the securities law agenda comprises changes of substantive provisions, 
as well. It currently consists of four measures dealing with the relationship between 
investors and corporations,64 and at least three measures reforming the institutional 
framework of the capital markets.65 We will focus on the former steps.
62 Generally speaking, in hierarchically organized boards (with a chairman), the chairman of the 
board of management receives twice the compensation of individual colleagues and the vice-chairman 
receives 1.5 times the compensation of individual colleagues, while in collegially organized boards all 
members are paid equally.
63 At first, the German liberal party F.D.P. sought to delay the adoption of the law by procedural 
tactics in the legislative process preceding the upcoming federal elections in September 2005. How-
ever, they reneged, which is probably due to the pressure for conformity exercised by the European 
Commission’s recommendation on director remuneration (see infra note 135).
64 Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz (transl.: Law on the Improvement of Investor Protection 
– AnSVG) of 29.10.2004, BGBl. I (2004) 2630; Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz – KapInhaG 
(transl.: Law pertaining to the Liability for Capital Market Information); Kapitalanleger-Musterver-
fahrensgesetz – KapMuG (transl.: Law introducing an Example Procedure for Investor Suits), BR-Drs. 
455/05, online < http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/portal/WWW/Webmaster/GB_I/I.4/Dokumentenarchiv/
dokument.php?k=BBD455/05 >; Prospektrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz of 22.06.2005, BGBl. I (2005) 
1698.
65 Investmentmodernisierungsgesetz (transl.: Law on the Modernization of Provisions Related to
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The Law on the Improvement of Investor Protection, which was adopted at the 
end of October 2004,66 strives for increased transparency and imposes civil and 
criminal liability for misconduct on securities market actors. Article 1 of this law 
primarily implements the European Market Abuse Directive,67 and the provisions 
defining details thereof,68 which have been enacted according to the European 
Lamfalussy-procedure.69 From a corporate governance perspective, we deem four 
aspects to be particularly relevant.
(1) The first aspect regards current change reports. German law has traditionally 
distinguished inside information from facts that triggered current change reports. 
Pursuant to Article 6 (1) of the Market Abuse Directive, an issuer will now have 
to file current change reports regarding any inside information which directly con-
cerns such issuer. That is, unless the issuer delays disclosure under its own respon-
sibility pursuant to Article 6 (2) of the Market Abuse Directive,70 it must make 
the aforementioned disclosure. The German Securities Trading Law is to change 
accordingly.71 Further, secondary insiders72 who forward inside information or rec-
ommendations to buy or sell financial instruments will be integrated into the range 
Investment Companies) of 15.12.2003, BGBl. I (2003) 2676; Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2002/ 
87/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 16. Dezember 2002 – Finanzkonglomerate-
RL-Umsetzungsgesetz (transl.: Law Implementing the European Rules on Financial Conglomerates), of 
21.12.2004, BGBl. I (2004) 3610; Gesetz zur Änderung der Vorschriften über Fernabsatzverträge bei 
Finanzdienstleistungen (Fernabsatz-Finanzdienstleistungsgesetz) (transl.: Law regulating the Distant 
Selling of Financial Services) of 02.12.2004, BGBl. I (2004) 3102. Article 3 of the Law on the Improve-
ment of Investor Protection also contains institutional reforms.
66 Above note 64. 
67 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (28.01.2003) OJ 2003 L 096/16.
68 Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29.04.2004 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market practices, the definition of inside 
information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the notifica-
tion of managers’ transactions and the notification of suspicious transactions; Commission Directive 
2003/124/EC of 22.12.2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition 
of market manipulation; Commission Directive 2003/125/EC of 22.12.2003 implementing Directive 
2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the fair presentation of investment 
recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest; Commission Regulation (EC)2273/2003 
of 22.12.2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards exemptions for buy-back programmes and stabilisation of financial instruments.
69 New procedure for deciding and applying securities legislation agreed by the European Council 
in March 2001 and endorsed by the European Parliament in Feb 2002 (see IP/02/195). 
70 “An issuer may under his own responsibility delay the public disclosure of inside information, as 
referred to in paragraph 1, such as not to prejudice his legitimate interests provided that such omission 
would not be likely to mislead the public and provided that the issuer is able to ensure the confidential-
ity of that information.”
71 In ss. 12 et seq., esp. 15 of the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (transl. Securities Trading Law), but 
also ss. 37b, 37c of the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz pertaining to civil liability.
72 I.e. those who received inside information from persons who have access to the source of com-
pany information (primary insiders).
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of regulatory offences as well. In the past, only those secondary insiders who were 
personally engaged in trading activities were subject to prosecution.73
(2) The second aspect is the implementation of Article 6 (9) of the Market Abuse 
Directive, which is the European whistle blower provision. The German Securities 
Trading Law will require that financial intermediaries and stock exchanges notify 
the FSA about any fact that gives rise to the assumption that a transaction might 
constitute insider dealing or market manipulation.74 The duty to blow the whistle 
merely extends to the level of market institutions, but not to the level of the firm: 
managers, employees, lawyers and public accountants do not have to notify securi-
ties agencies upon receiving knowledge of suspicious facts.
(3) Third: The European framework defines, in detail, illegal practices of market 
manipulation. Its adaptation requires some changes to the German provisions on 
market manipulation which were enacted with the Fourth Law on the Improvement 
of Financial Markets in 2002.75 The fact that the finding of market manipulation 
will not require the malefactor to act in bad faith probably constitutes the most 
significant change. Rather, it will suffice that his or her actions are able to manipu-
late the capital markets.76 Furthermore, the specific actions that are considered 
to constitute market manipulation have been defined in an order by the Federal 
Secretary of Finance.77 In addition, the German legislature adopts the European 
safe-harbour-regime,78 which is likely to increase the level of certainty for market 
participants. 
(4) Finally, Article 12 of the Market Abuse Directive mandates changes in the 
law governing the German FSA (“BaFin”). The BAFin will be empowered to 
in terpret and define details of European and German Securities Law provisions on 
a plethora of issues.79 Thereby, the legislature intends to create the preconditions 
necessary for future adaptations of technical provisions, as well as cooperation 
between European securities regulators.80 Though the vesting of extensive  powers 
in a federal agency is a well known phenomenon (for example in the United States), 
the German constitution requires that all material provisions are enacted by 
Parliament.81 The extended powers of the BaFin, even though they may be justi-
73 S. 39 of the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Securities Trading Law) will be changed accordingly.
74 S. 10 of the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Securities Trading Law) (AnSVG).
75 Above note 17.
76 S. 20a (1) of the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Securities Trading Law) (AnSVG).
77 See Federal Secretary of Finance, Verordnung zur Konkretisierung des Verbotes der Marktmani-
pulation – MaKonV (transl.: Order with respect to the appropriation of market manipulation), 01.03.2005, 
BGBl. I (2005) 515.
78 Pursuant to Article 1 (2) Market Abuse Directive and Art. 4 and 5 of Commission Directive 
2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003, above note 68. The Regulation of the German Federal Secretary of 
Finance on the Specification of the Prohibition of Market Manipulation of 11.11.2003, BGBl. I (2003) 
2300, augments European law.
79 Eg, see ss. 15 (7), 29, 35 (4), 36 (5), 37i (1) S.3, 37m S.3 of the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Se -
curities Trading Law) (AnSVG). 
80 See Article 16 of the Market Abuse Directive, implemented through Article 36c of the Wertpa-
pierhandelsgesetz (Securities Trading Law) (AnSVG).
81 See the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision in Kalkar, BVerfGE 49, 89, 126; Hochschul -
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fied under European law, may conflict with this requirement.
The Law implementing the Prospectus Directive82 also emanates from Euro-
pean reform activity triggered by the Financial Services Action Plan. The law 
seeks to abolish the legislative distinction between a public offering of securities 
(currently regulated in the Verkaufsprospektgesetz) and the offering of securities 
that are admitted to being traded at a stock exchange (currently regulated in the 
Börsengesetz). As both kinds of securities will be dealt with in a new Wertpa-
pierprospektgesetz (Law on Securities Prospectuses),83 the relevant sections of the 
aforementioned laws and orders thereon will be repealed. Further, stock exchanges 
have currently jurisdiction with respect to the formal review of prospectuses with 
respect to securities admitted to stock exchanges, while prospectuses for public 
offerings are reviewed by the BAFin. In the future, the BAFin will review all types 
of prospectuses. The BAFin will thereby be turned into a fully-integrated securi-
ties regulator, which is positive for the agency’s standing in Europe and beyond. 
Moreover, the measure is likely to prevent the stock exchanges from conflicts of 
interests when reviewing draft prospectuses. However, since both the Verkauf-
sprospektgesetz and the Wertpapierprospektgesetz contain liability provisions, the 
traditional distinction will be retained with respect to provisions on liability for 
prospectus information. The Government intends to address this methodical inac-
curacy in a later reform step. 
The two other securities law (proposal)s are rooted in the Federal Government’s 
Ten-Step Program: First, the proposal on a Law pertaining to the Liability for 
Capital Market Information84 is an attempt by the German government to close 
what it and some commentators85 perceive to be a loophole in German securities 
regulation. During the tech bubble, some technology firms (artificially?) pushed up 
their share prices by issuing inaccurate current change reports and press releases. 
Dealing with this behaviour was a serious issue in Germany. For a finding of 
wrongful disclosure, necessary in order to justify imposing civil liability, German 
law requires that there is evidence of intent.86 As a deterrence measure, the cur-
organisationsrecht, BVerfGE 61, 260, 275; Familiennachzug, BVerfGE 76, 1, 74; C-Waffen, BVerfGE 
77, 170, 230 (Wesentlichkeitstheorie).
82 Above note 64. Further relevant determinations are: (1) German issuers can choose whether 
they want to issue German and English or merely English prospectuses; (2) a simplified authorization 
procedure exists with respect to bonds; (3) the law defines the date up to which an issuer must update 
a prospectus. 
83 Pursuant to Article 1 of the Prospektrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz, above note 64; see J Ekkenga, 
‘Änderungs- und Ergänzungsvorschläge zum Regierungsentwurf eines neuen Wertpapierprospektge-
setzes’ (transl.: suggestions for altering and supplementing the draft for a Wertpapierprospektgesetz) 
BETRIEBSBERATER (2005) 561.
84 Above note 64.
85 Baums, “Report”, above note 30, No. 186 et seq.; H Fleischer, Statement at the 64th session of 
the Verein Deutscher Juristentag e.V. (German lawyers’ society – DJV), in DJV (ed), 64th session of 
the DJV (Beck, Munich: 2002) F99.
86 Pursuant to s. 826 BGB, see, for example, Infomatec, BGH (Federal Supreme Court) of 19.07 2004
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rent proposal seeks to establish civil liability for members of the management and 
supervisory boards, based on a standard of care equivalent to that for civil liability 
in negligence. This civil liability will result from the issuance of any misstatement 
in oral or written communication that is induced by the issuer, eg at shareholder 
meetings and analyst conferences. However, the threat of civil liability does not 
pertain to interviews given to the press. According to the proposal, the liability of 
board members for negligent misstatements will be limited to four years’ income. 
Further, the proposal undertakes to intensify the civil liability for misstatements of 
certified accountants and other experts.87 While there is no question that criminal 
actors should be held liable which German law allows both with respect to civil 
and criminal88 liability, the business community argues that strict(er) liability may 
hamper bona fide disclosure, and it may harm capital market efficiency through 
a general lack of information. Thus, the draft-Law pertaining to the Liability for 
Capital Market Information is currently under revision. It may be put on the leg-
islative agenda after the next federal elections. 
While the above proposal relates to substantive claims of investors, the other 
(already adopted) measure concerns procedural issues relating to class actions. 
German corporate law currently does not allow for class action suits, with two 
consequences: First, courts can hardly handle large-scale securities actions in an 
orderly and timely fashion. Second, substantive claims for misleading disclosure 
and market manipulation may not be realized, due to the high costs and risk of 
corporate and securities litigation that must be borne by the first claimant.89 The 
German legislature addresses these problems with the Law on Example Procedures 
for Investor Suits.90 The law strives to enable shareholders to take advantage of col-
lective suits without importing the flaws of American type securities class actions 
that are – as mentioned above91 – considered to be particularly lawyer-, rather than 
investor-driven. Therefore, the law requires that all disclosure-related claims must 
be filed at the regional court of the company’s registered seat. When 11 suits are 
filed upon the same disclosure item, the higher regional court will decide upon 
the factual basis of the claims. In this procedure, the claimant with the highest 
– II ZR 217/03, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (2004) 811. For misleading 
disclosure related to a firm’s financial situation, civil liability might result from s. 823 (2) of the BGB 
(transl. German Civil Code) in connection with s. 400 of the Aktiengesetz. 
87 This, in particular, pertains to expert statements in prospectuses. For example, if an accountant 
certifies a financial statement that the issuer includes in a prospectus, the accountant may be held liable 
for a misleading expert statement.
88 BGH (Federal Supreme Court) of 16.12.2004 – 1 StR 420/03, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GE -
SELLSCHAFTSRECHT (2005) 132 re Haffa/EM.TV.
89 With respect to “collective action problems” regarding shareholder suits see above note 45.
90 Above note 64. For details, see F Reuschle, ’Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz’ (transl. 
The Law on Example Procedures for Investor Suits) NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTS-
RECHT (2004) 590.
91 Above note 42.
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single damage claim is to become the “sample claimant”. Other claimants may 
support the sample claimant’s evidence and procedure as “additional claimants”. 
Once the higher regional court has decided upon the claim of the sample claimant, 
the regional court will deal with the peculiarities of the other claims. If the court 
dismisses the claim, all claimants will have to share in the costs of the sample 
procedure. 
3. Accounting Law
Finally, the German government is reforming accounting law to a significant extent. 
In addition to a general tendency towards enhancing the scope of application of 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the Accounting Reform 
Law92 strives to strengthen auditor independence. The significance of these altera-
tions was demonstrated by the international scandals of Enron and Worldcom, as 
well as Ahold and Parmalat. The Accounting Reform Law imposes strict rules 
through a variety of measures which emphasize the principle “Keep your distance!” 
– Accountants should keep their distance from the firms by avoiding any relation-
ship with the firm beyond that of accountant-client.93 
Until the present, auditors were prohibited from certifying financial statements 
when they participated in keeping the books or preparing the firm’s financial state-
ments, or when they received more than 30 percent of their turnover from a single 
client. The Accounting Reform Law will lower the threshold to 15 percent of the 
turnover. In addition, auditors will be prohibited from certifying statements when 
they supply material management or financial services, insurance, or evaluation 
services to the firm. The Accounting Reform Law is even stricter with respect to 
accountants for public corporations and firms that offer financial and insurance 
services. These accountants must not supply tax or law consultancy with regard 
to the same financial statement that they certify, must not appear in court for the 
company, and must not implement computer systems for bookkeeping purposes. 
If these measures do not succeed in raising the accountant’s diligence, the 
Accounting Control Law94 introduces a two-step enforcement procedure for public 
corporations. The first step will be executed by a privately organized, indepen-
dent body, termed the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (“the Panel”). This 
institution reviews statements of firms where there is some evidence of inaccurate 
accounting. Further, it undertakes random checks and reviews on behalf of the 
BaFin. If it finds that there are indeed accounting failures, it cooperates with the 
92 Gesetz zur Einführung internationaler Rechnungslegungsstandards und zur Sicherung der Qualität 
der Abschlussprüfung (Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz – BilReG) of 4.12.2004, BGBl. I (2004) 3166.
93 Otherwise, as JC Coffee, Jr., ‘What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of 
the 1990s’ 89 Cornell L.R. (2004) 269 states, the market will understand payments from the firm to 
the accountant as “bribes”, and the reduction of these payments as “punishment”.
94 “Gesetz zur Kontrolle von Unternehmensabschluessen (Bilanzrechtskontrollgesetz – BilKoG)” 
of 15.12.2004, BGBl. I (2004) 3408.
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firm in order to correct the statements. As a second step, if the Panel and the firm 
do not agree on an accounting issue, the BaFin may examine the statements by 
itself and impose enforcement measures. 
At this point in time, three aspects of the Accounting Control Law appear to be at 
odds. First: the Panel is a control institution in which the body of publicly certified 
accountants watches its peers. Rather than establishing another semi-independent 
institution, the legislature should focus on providing the accounting professionals 
with the proper incentives for remaining independent, eg through increased liability 
(see below). Second, the control institution has no jurisdiction of any kind about the 
issue upon which it is deciding. Consequently, without res judicata of the Panel’s 
decision, from a legal point of view, there is no benefit to the firm, other than that 
it receives an additional opinion on an accounting issue.95 Third, accounting law is 
made on an international and European level. The Panel, however, is to be estab-
lished and financed by parties of the “German economy”. We wonder whether this 
circle of actors is appropriate for firms with an international focus.
Eventually, the Law on the Supervision of Accountants96 increases the pres-
sure on accountants by means of a further method. It implements an independent 
body, the Abschlussprüferaufsichtskommission (Accounting Supervisory Commit-
tee – APAK) under the supervision of the German Federal Secretary of Business 
and Labor, that is to supervise the self-administration and self-supervision system 
currently exercised by the Wirtschaftsprüferkammer (Association of publicy certi-
fied accountants). 
Given that the German tech bubble was not characterized by large scale account-
ing fraud (which regards retrospective information), but by the abuse of looking-
forward information, it is questionable, however, whether all these steps together 
were necessary, and whether it was advisable to implement all these measures 
in a very short period of time. It is likely that with respect to accounting law, 
waiting would have reduced the need for voluminous legislation – to the benefit 
of society.97 Furthermore, if one had sought to increase the pressure on accoun-
tants, the lifting of the liability-privilege that accountants enjoy under German 
law98 would have been a less expensive, but (at least) equally efficient measure 
95 B Grossfeld, ‘Bilanzkontrollgesetz – Offene Fragen und etwas Optimismus’ (transl.: The Ac-
counting Control Law – Open questions and some optimism” NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELL-
SCHAFTSRECHT (2004) 105, suggests giving the Accounting Control Law the benefit of the doubt: 
Given the seismic changes that currently shake the accounting law and the accounting profession, a 
privately organized control institution would be a capable forum for a get-together of professionals who 
are on the lookout for the appropriate solution. We are convinced, however, that public corporations will 
not be willing to pay tutorial lessons for highly-paid accounting professionals for a long time.
96 Abschlussprüferaufsichtsgesetz (APAG) of 27.12.2004, BGBl. I (2004), 3846.
97 See with respect to the timing of law-making, in general, F Paris, V Fon & N Ghei, ‘The Value 
of Waiting in Lawmaking’, from SSRN, in EurJ L & Econ. (forthcoming). 
98 Subject to s. 323 of the Handelsgesetzbuch, accountants are merely liable vis-à-vis the corpora-
tion. Further, liability is capped at ¤ 4 Mio. for each financial review of a public corporation.
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in increasing accounting diligence. Insofar, we might see the aforementioned Law 
pertaining to the Liability for Capital Market Information filling the gap – but sadly 
in addition to, and not instead of, other legislation.
C. Assessment
Though the sheer volume of changes hinders a discrete systemization, we see, from 
a corporate governance perspective, four tendencies.
(1) First, almost all of the legislative steps strive to provide investors with better 
information. This is particularly true with respect to the abundance of enforce-
ment measures, which should guarantee that managers and accountants do their 
job correctly. This information may be used for exercising both explicit influence 
– the traditional German way –, as well as implicit influence – the new market-
oriented way.
(2) Second, besides the adjustments to the decision-directed suit, the reforms 
generally strengthen shareholder rights to sue to a significant degree. From a 
German point of view, the additional shareholder rights to sue constitute the most 
spectacular step. This pertains to suits which an Anglo-American observer would 
consider to be derivative suits, as well as to those which are filed for “regular” 
securities fraud. A consequence of this change is that certain powers will be shifted 
from the supervisory board to shareholders and investors.99 
Currently, it is uncertain whether investor and shareholder suits will, in fact, 
strengthen the overall supervision of managers in a two-tier board system,100 or 
whether it will deter day-to-day supervision through a “race to the courts.” At least, 
before the legislature takes further steps, it is well-advised to test the effect of the 
current reforms for a significant period of time.101
(3) Third, the German legislature strives for additional improvements to 
the law on shareholder meetings. A foreign spectator might wonder whether 
the shareholder meeting may be characterized as a corporate governance device. 
99 Traditionally, the German supervisory board did not only fulfil responsibilities that are inherent 
to the board in one-tier board systems, but its existence also mitigated shareholder rights to sue officers 
for damages to the corporation.This is because the legislature traditionally assumed that the supervisory 
board, with the best information, would have the best preconditions for assessing whether a suit against 
officers is worth the efforts, or whether other efforts are deemed more effective.
100 As Baums/Scott, above note 41, expect.
101 The legislature should consider that, as we have experienced with respect to the contest of share-
holder meeting decisions, the German corporate world is as vulnerable to strike suits as is, for example, 
the United States and Japan. Further, as some commentators have pointed out (for example Eugene F. 
Fama, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1980) J. Pol. Econ. 88, 288, at 293 et seq.), 
managers are much more vulnerable to losses in reputation as compared to financial losses. We think 
that a sudden dismissal sends a better signal to the market than any shareholder suit that is costly to 
the firm can do. The recent German economic history, in which close ties between the large firms have 
possibly enabled a flow of information between the firms as to why exactly a sudden dismissal occurred 
– with the information intermediary in this process being the banks – demonstrates this effect.
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Remarkably, the argument that rational shareholders would not invest time and 
money in the participation at shareholder meetings – the famous “rational apathy” 
argument102 – does not seem to hold water with respect to German sharehold-
ers. In fact, more than 4,000 shareholders (as individuals), on average, attend the 
meetings of the thirty largest German publicly listed corporations.103 We hold that, 
despite some conceptual weaknesses, this surprisingly high turnout catalyzes at 
least some positive effects, which cannot be considered in detail here.104 How-
ever, European (non-German) and international shareholders do not participate in 
German shareholder meetings to the same extent. Consequently, the government’s 
measures primarily seek to achieve higher international turnouts (since German 
turnout is already high), through facilitating cross-border authorization and the use 
of the internet in all procedural steps of the meeting.
Other than with respect to shareholder meetings, we do not see any changes to 
substantive corporate law. Rather, the German government merely focuses on the 
better enforcement of duties that already exist. We account for the relatively mod-
est type of adjustments by the fact that the current regime has proven to be quite 
effective for big firms that typically abide by the rules. Thus, substantial changes 
do not seem appropriate, but enforcement – a matter that is particularly relevant 
for smaller firms – does.
(4) Finally, we have shown that the state increasingly interferes with the corpo-
rate conduct of publicly listed firms. It does so by means of quasi-mandatory pro-
visions, such as the Corporate Governance Code, or by public regulation, through 
the extensive powers given to securities regulators. Many of these provisions are 
prompted by European regulators, hence, it would be misleading to attribute the 
whole increase in regulatory measures to German authorities. Further, regulatory 
density is an international trend. We are, however, critical as to whether dense 
regulation is likely to mitigate the criminal intent of those who want to abuse 
securities markets. Rather, criminals tend to deem themselves cleverer than the 
system which they abuse. It certainly does, however, raise the costs to the firms 
that are subject to these rules.
As an intermediate result, we hold that the current reforms in Germany follow 
102 The Berle & Means concept (in: The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933) 64-65, 
and 244 et seq.) has been repeated over and over again, see R C Clark, Corporate Law (1986) 390; 
E Latham, ‘The Commonwealth of the Corporation’ 55 Nw. U.L.R. (1960) 25; H G Manne, ‘Some 
Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting – An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle’, 64 Colum. L.R. (1964) 
1427, 1437-8; F H Easterbrook & D Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge MA: 1991) 77; M M Siems, Die Konvergenz Im Rechtssystem der Aktionäre 
(transl. The Convergence of Legal Systems in the Law on Shareholders – A Study on Comparative 
Corporate Governance in the Era of Globalisation), (Mohr, Tübingen: 2005) at 72 et seq.
103 Zetzsche, ‘Explicit and Implicit System’, at B.III.3.b).
104 On the benefits, see idem, at B.III.3.c). On the conceptual weaknesses, see U Noack, ‘Hauptvers-
ammlung und Internet: Information – Kommunikation – Entscheidung’ (transl.: Shareholder Meetings 
and the Internet: Information, Communication, Decision), CBC Research Paper, online < http://ssrn.
com/abstract=646723 >. 
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the same pattern as have all of the reforms that have taken place over the last 
decade: The German government endeavours to invigorate the capital markets, 
thereby securing their pricing and monitoring functions, by implementing rules that 
enable both public and private enforcement. Insofar, the current reform steps bring 
the German securities law more in line with traditionally (more) market-oriented 
states, such as England and the United States. At the same time, the traditional 
explicit measures still have a place in the German system of corporate control. 
However, all of these reforms have pushed German legal resources to the lim-
its. Many of the aforementioned laws were hastily written and/or hastily adopted 
by the legislature – a procedure, which experience shows is likely to result in 
inaccuracies and methodological flaws.105 Time pressure also often resulted in an 
Anglo-American detail-oriented style of drafting, as time for developing self-evi-
dent principles (rather than rules) was scarce. Since practice tends to construe 
detail-oriented rules narrowly, we expect either costs of enforcement to rise or the 
necessity of subsequent rectification of legislative deficiencies to emerge in the near 
future. Moreover, the current reform steps require immense effort in corporations, 
the government, law firms, and German academics, as well. We doubt that there 
is any corporate lawyer who can seriously claim to be up to date with respect to 
all reform issues currently on the table. From the perspective of the corporations, 
after ten years of permanent changes in corporate law, it is time for doing business 
again. From the perspective of the national legislature, it is time to get engaged 
in the European and international discussion with the intention of ensuring that 
costs of further legislative changes are not imposed on German firms. Eventually, 
from the perspective of the law professor, it is time to concentrate on systemic 
considerations and teaching the law, after almost a decade of hastily chasing, and 
commenting on, the new reform steps. 
IV. Outlook
Unfortunately, a brief look at the European level provides us with the insight that 
we cannot reasonably expect the pace of corporate law reform to slow down in the 
near future. Instead, European Law will likely trigger further reform: the Disclosure 
Directive of 2003,106 the harmonization of European accounting laws,107 the Pro-
105 Many of the aforementioned proposals contain multi-layer legislation. European directives and 
regulations, as well as national laws and regulations, and codes of conduct, needed to be considered. 
Under these conditions, mistakes are likely in hastily drafted laws.
106 Directive 2003/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 
68/151/EEC, as regards disclosure requirements in respect of certain types of companies (15.07.2003) 
OJ 2003 L 221/13.
107 A Law for the Modernization of Accounting Law that will harmonize the German Commercial 
Law with the IFRS is planned for summer 2005. 
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spectuses Directive,108 the Transparency Directive,109 the Takeover Directive,110 
and the forthcoming Directives on Cross-border mergers,111 and the Cross-border 
transfer of registered offices,112 the reform of the Second Directive113 as well as 
the Eighth Company Law Directive114 will keep the national legislatures busy. 
Additionally, three issues of the European agenda deserve particular attention with 
regard to the German corporate governance system.115 These are: (1) access to 
company data; (2) shareholder rights; and (3) the structure of the supervisory board 
and the board of management.
108 The Prospectuses Directive (Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading 
and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (04.11.2003) OJ 2003 L 345/64 and the Commission Regulation 
implementing the Prospectus Directive (29.04.2004) OJ L 2004 215/3 [Prospectuses Regulation] strive 
for easier access to capital in Europe, as well as increased transparency and market integrity. By harmo-
nising the necessary disclosure requirements, the new legal framework as a whole creates an effective 
“single passport” for both EU and non-EU issuers. The Regulation will come into force 01.07.2005, 
the day on which the deadline for Member States to implement the Framework Directive expires. 
109 Transparency Directive on the requirements for information provided about issuers whose secu-
rities are admitted for trading on a regulated market (17.12.2004) OJ 2004 L 390/38. 
110 The Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on takeover bids 
(21.04.2004) OJ 2004 L 142/12, seeks to establish minimum guidelines for the conduct of takeover 
bids involving the securities of publicly listed companies governed by the laws of Member States, as 
well as an adequate level of protection for securities holders throughout the European Community. 
111 The Council adopted the European Commission’s proposal for a 10th Company Law Directive 
on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies on 25.11.2004. On 10.05.2005, the European 
Parliament adopted the proposal. See online < http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/
company/mergers/mergers_en.htm >. 
112 In February 2004, the European Commission launched a public consultation that relates to the 
outline of the planned proposal for a 14th Company Law Directive on the cross-border transfer of 
the registered office of limited companies. For details, see online: < http://europa.eu.int/comm/inter-
nal_market/company/seat-transfer/index_en.htm >. Whether this proposal will result in a directive is yet 
unclear. The more European case law on transfer of seats evolves, the lesser the need for a proposal.
113 Second Company Law Directive covering the formation, maintenance and alteration of capital 
(77/91/EEC). In fall 2004, the European Commission proposed the following changes to this old Direc-
tive: (1) limiting the need for an expert valuation of contributions in kind when a company establishes 
itself or increases capital; (2) relaxing current rules on the limitation or withdrawal of pre-emption 
rights, to make the procedure of issuing new shares less burdensome while maintaining shareholders’ 
protection from dilution of their shareholdings; (3) partially relaxing the prohibition on companies 
providing financial assistance for acquisition of their shares by third parties; (4) introducing “squeeze 
out”- and “sell out”-rights (ie the right of the majority shareholder, under certain conditions, to buy out 
minority shareholders at a fair price and the complementary right of minority shareholders to compel 
the majority shareholder to buy their shares); (5) introducing a right for the company to acquire its own 
shares up to the limits of distributable reserves. For details, see online: < http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/company/capital/index_en.htm >.
114 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/financial-reporting/index_en.htm . 
115 See further K J Hopt,’Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht und deutsche  Unternehmensverfassung’ 
(transl: European Corporate Law and German Company Law Regime), ZEITRSCHRIFT FÜR WIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT – ZIP (2005) 461 . 
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A. Accessibility of Company Data
The first issue pertains to the accessibility of company data. Under European and 
national law, private and public companies, cooperatives and some forms of part-
nerships must disclose certain basic data and financial statements. Presently, how-
ever, a uniform disclosure system does not exist in Germany. Instead, company data 
are subject to registration at systems that are organized and administered by local 
courts (so called “Handelsregister”), and are primarily published in local newspa-
pers. Other information is accessible at the company’s website, the websites of the 
stock exchanges and private information intermediaries, as well as the authorities 
involved in the supervision of corporate and securities law. The split jurisdiction 
of the German federal states and the involvement of manifold public, private, and 
semi-private actors in providing company information impose significant costs 
upon those seeking company information. 
In order to curb this uncontrolled growth in the use of media for company 
disclosure, the Federal German government took a first step by launching an elec-
tronic version of the federal bulletin in 2003,116 and mandating that some corporate 
information is published in this electronic version. However, further legislative 
steps are required117 to fulfil the conditions of the new Disclosure Directive and the 
Transparency Directive.118 These steps include a legislative requirement to register, 
and store digitally, all company data that are disclosed, and to publish them at one 
central website. The storage and the website together would constitute the “German 
Company Register.” Such a central, internet-based disclosure system must fulfil 
three criteria: (1) permanent storage; (2) immutability; and (3) accessibility for all 
parties who are interested in company data.119 
In April 2005, the German Secretary of Justice presented a proposal on how 
to establish a uniform company disclosure system in Germany that is open to the 
various needs provided by accounting, corporate and securities law, in a European 
as well as in a national context.120 This EHUG-proposal constitutes a step towards 
the implementation of the European Business Register (EBR), by setting up an 
integrated storage mechanism (www.handelsregister.de) run by the courts and a dis-
116 Online: < www.ebundesanzeiger.de>.
117 U Noack, ‘Digital disclosure of company data in Germany and Europe – Regarding the implemen-
tation of the European Directive regarding Disclosure in respect of Certain Types of Companies and the 
Transparency Directive in Germany’ CBC Research Paper, online < http://ssrn.com/abstract=610001 > 
[Noack, ‘Digital disclosure’].
118 Transparency Directive, above note 109, at Article 21 (2). 
119 A public-private partnership involving private technical and administrative partners and supervi-
sion through a public agency may best fulfil these requirements, see Noack, ‘Digital disclosure’, above 
note 117.
120 Federal Secretary of Justice, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über elektronische Handelsregister, Genos-
senschaftsregister sowie das Unternehmensregister – EHUG (transl.: Proposal for a Law on the electronic 
commercial, cooperative and business register), 07.04.2005, online < http://www.bmj.de/media/archive/
890.pdf >.
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semination mechanism (www.e-bundesanzeiger.de) run by a private entity.121 This 
system is theoretically designed to become an advanced version of the American 
EDGAR-System for Europe. 
The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) that currently works 
on implementing measures for the Transparency Directive is, however, critical 
as to whether the EPR is an apt basis for a capital market database. CESR does 
not consider the overlap between the information required under the respective 
directives significant enough to justify the costs of the creation of links between 
these two separate sets of information in the near future.”122 This is unfortunate, 
given that efficiency arguments support one register that contains all company 
data of public and close corporations. Further, a distinction between registers that 
is predicated on the definition of corporations issuing securities that are admitted 
to trading on a regulated market disregards the many medium-sized corporations 
that issue shares that are not traded at stock exchanges but effectively turned into 
quasi-public corporations through dilution of shares. CESR’s distinction appears to 
be artificial, given that the Prospectus Directive pushes for a merge of both types 
of issuers. Finally, CESR’s argument that company registers are made for business 
counterparts, while the Transparency Directive storage mechanism is exclusively 
meant for investors, does neither hold true in the one, nor the other direction. Thus, 
we may suggest that CESR’s stance is at least partly due to the distinction between 
the jurisdiction for securities law and company law that we observe in European 
and many national institutions. Requiring both registers to merge would require 
institutions to cooperate, where these typically compete with each other.
However, CESR does not argue against an integration of the information pools 
assembled under securities and company law, with the company register being set 
up to include the storage mechanism, as well. This is the alternative that the Ger-
man Federal Secretary of Justice was proposing with its EHUG-draft. We hope 
that the German legislature will continue this approach after the federal elections 
being held in fall 2005.
B. Shareholder Rights
The second issue arises from the Transparency Directive, which establishes stan-
dards for shareholder information, and shareholder proxy voting. 
With respect to shareholder information, the Transparency Directive requires, 
121 Theoretically, the dissemination platform is a useless double-feature. However, many provisions, 
of which most are required by European law, distinguish between the storage and the dissemination of 
information. Therefore, the legislature decided to implement both, but as technically connected measures. 
Users enjoy nevertheless a one-stop-shop.
122 See CESR, Progress Report Regarding Possible Implementing Measures of The Transparency 
Directive on the Role of Officially Appointed Mechanism (Article 21 2) and the Setting up of a Euro-
pean Electronic Network of Information about Issuers (Article 22) and Electronic Filing (Article 19 
4a), Ref: 05-150b (03/2005), at ¶152–154, online <http://www.cesr-eu.org>.
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in particular, information about the place, time and agenda of shareholder meet-
ings, and the rights of holders to participate in meetings.123 Member States must 
allow the use of electronic means for the purposes of conveying information to 
shareholders if the shareholders so decide.124 If the shareholder meeting decides 
accordingly, the issuer must organize an electronic dissemination procedure.125 We 
deem several aspects of the information requirements problematic: 
1) The fact that the shareholder meeting is to decide upon the level of infor-
mation that individual shareholders can have access to provides an opportunity 
for majority shareholders to abuse the vote: If the controlling shareholder is not 
interested in timely information being provided to all shareholders (for example, 
because this information would enable a minority to establish a quorum for the 
exercise of a minority right), he will vote against electronic information. Conse-
quently, the German Aktiengesetz that establishes a well-functioning dissemination 
procedure regarding meeting-related information enables electronic dissemination 
of information to all shareholders without the consent of the shareholder meeting 
being required.126 
2) There is an “apportionment of costs” provision, under which shareholders 
may be required to bear the costs of dissemination of information by electronic 
means, which hampers the establishment of cost-efficient solutions to dissemination 
problems. Rather than making shareholders pay the costs, where such sharehold-
ers cannot effectively coordinate their interests vis-à-vis the intermediaries, the 
issuer should bear the costs for the electronic dissemination. Efficient bargaining 
between representatives of the banks and the issuers will then lead to cost efficient 
solutions. 
3) Article 17 of the Transparency Directive merely requires dissemination of 
information to market institutions, such as information intermediaries. In addition, 
dissemination of meeting-related information to shareholders is required, in order 
to overcome adverse incentives to vote. Information that is disseminated to the 
shareholders by the use of a “push-system”127 is an appropriate mechanism for 
123 Pursuant to Article 17 (2) of the Transparency Directive, above note 109, share issuers are 
required to ensure that all of the facilities and information necessary to enable holders of shares to 
exercise their rights, are available in the issuer’s home Member State. Further, the Transparency Direc-
tive requires information about the total number of shares and votes that the company has. Pursuant 
to Article 21 (1) of the Transparency Directive the information must be disclosed on a timely and a 
non-discriminatory basis. 
124 Article 17 (3) of the Transparency Directive. 
125 Four conditions apply: 1) the use of electronic means may not depend upon the location of the 
seat or residence of the shareholder; 2) identification arrangements are to be put in place so that the 
shareholders are effectively informed; 3) shareholders are to be contacted in writing to request their 
consent to the use of electronic means, and their consent is deemed to be given if they do not object; 
and finally 4) the issuer is to determine the apportionment of costs entailed in the conveyance of infor-
mation by electronic means. 
126 Ss. 121, 123 – 128, and in particular s. 125 (2) of the Aktiengesetz (since 2001). 
127 For systems of disseminating information from a comparative perspective, see D A Zetzsche,
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triggering shareholder activism, since it significantly reduces the information costs 
of shareholders for participating in the vote.
Under the Transparency Directive shareholders are also entitled to exercise vot-
ing rights by proxy. The Directive requires that “issuers make available electronic 
or paper proxy forms to each person entitled to vote.” However, a paper-based 
solution is not practical with respect to bearer shares, which are widely accepted in 
Germany. Bearer shares issuers that send a paper proxy form to each shareholder 
would increase both their own costs and the expenditures of the financial inter-
mediaries that are involved in the process. This is due to the fact that these forms 
must be channelled through a chain of intermediaries.128 In practice, the same is 
true with respect to registered shares. Digitalisation would reduce these costs. Thus, 
we would propose that firms which offer an internet-based proxy system should 
not be required to send paper-based proxy forms to all shareholders, but only to 
those who expressly wish so.129 
Moreover, we criticize the Transparency Directive to the extent that it inter-
feres with the current transition from electronic proxy voting to electronic direct 
voting130 by stipulating “proxy forms” rather than using open expressions. Finally, 
if a legal regime establishes a proxy system that is primarily based on a proxy to 
management, it requires a default rule that does not favour management: proxies 
given to a representative of the firm that do not contain directions as to whether 
the representative should vote in favour or against the management’s proposal 
should be interpreted as abstention.131 Otherwise, management may abuse the proxy 
mechanism to the detriment of shareholders. 
‘Corporate Governance in Cyberspace – A Blueprint for Virtual Shareholder Meetings’ CBC Research 
Paper, online < http://ssrn.com/abstract =747347 >, at III.1. [Zetzsche, ‘Corporate Governance in Cyber-
space’].
128 See Simon & Zetzsche, supra note 47. 
129 For details on the virtual shareholder meetings of companies that issue bearer shares see D A 
Zetzsche, in Zetzsche (ed), Die Virtuelle Hauptversammlung (transl.: The Virtual Shareholder Meeting), 
(Schmidt, Berlin: 2002) No. 47 et seq.
130 See U Noack, ‘Hauptversammlung und Internet: Information – Kommunikation – Entschei-
dung’ (transl.: Shareholders’ Meeting and the Internet: Information – Communication – Decision), CBC 
Research Paper, online: < http://ssrn.com/abstract=646723 >, and ‘Neue Entwicklungen im Aktienrecht 
und moderne Informationstechnologie 2003 – 2005’ NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTS-
RECHT – NZG (2004) 297, and ‘Zukunft der Hauptversammlung – Hauptversammlung der Zukunft’ 
(transl.: Future of the shareholder meeting – shareholder meeting of the future?) in D A Zetzsche (ed), 
Die Virtuelle Hauptversammlung, ibid, No. 6, and, co-authored with M Beurskens ‘Internet-Influence 
on Corporate Governance’ EBOR (2002) 129; Zetzsche, ‘Corporate Governance in Cyberspace’, supra 
note 127, at III.2.
131 This is the majority opinion under German law, see U Noack, ‘Die organisierte Stimmrechtsver-
tretung auf Hauptversammlungen’ (transl.: Organized proxies in shareholder meetings), in Festschrift für 
Marcus Lutter (2000), 1463, 1480 [Noack, in: FS Lutter]; R Pikò & T Preissler in DA Zetzsche (ed), 
Die Virtuelle Hauptversammlung, ibid, No. 348, with further citations; B Riegger, ‘Hauptversammlung 
und Internet’ (transl.: Shareholder Meeting and Internet), 165 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE 
HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT – ZHR (2001) 204, 213 f. (dissenting). 
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We hope that these issues will be addressed in the Shareholder Rights Directive 
that the European Commission is currently preparing in conjunction with its con-
sultation on the cross-border exercise of shareholder rights in Europe.132 We note, 
however, that the European roadmap on shareholder rights is currently confusing 
insofar as the Transparency Directive is predicated on the assumption that the 
companies and Member States know who the shareholders are in a cross-border set-
ting. In fact, in light of the de-materialisation of shares and the use of global share 
certificates,133 the clear identification of shareholders requires further European 
harmonization. In that respect, we now find a relevant discussion in the consultation 
on cross-border exercise of shareholder rights. Hence, the Transparency Directive 
took the second step before the first.
If the European regulators finally enact the proposals that the European Com-
mission proposes in the above-mentioned consultation, German law will not need 
to be significantly altered: The Aktiengesetz already vests shareholders with the 
right to vote by proxy. In addition, the different devices for shareholder identifica-
tion, which the proposal suggests, are dealt with in mandatory provisions of the 
German laws relating to shareholder meetings.134 Thus, the legislative changes in 
the last ten years have the German law on shareholder meetings well-prepared for 
the cross-border exercise of shareholder rights in Europe.
C. Board Structure
Finally, European law aims at regulating details regarding board structures and 
board remuneration in Europe through two recommendations that the European 
Commission issued in fall 2004. The recommendation on directors’ remuneration135 
seeks to ensure that shareholders are able to appreciate fully the relationship between 
the performance of the company and the level of remuneration of directors, both 
ex ante and ex post, and to make decisions on the remuneration items linked to 
the share price. Since the legislature adopted the aforementioned VorstOG,136 the 
need for legislative action following from this recommendation merely pertains to 
the powers of shareholders to decide upon the remuneration of the German board 
of management. This is due to the fact that German shareholders already have the 
power to decide upon the remuneration of the supervisory board members. 
132 European Commission, first and second consultation ‘Fostering an appropriate regime for 
share holders’ rights’, and the preliminary results issued April 2005, online: < http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internal_market/company/shareholders/index_en.htm>. See U Noack, ‘Aktionärsrechte im EU-
Kapitalbinnenmarkt’ (transl.: Shareholder Rights in the EU Common Capital Market), ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT – ZIP (2005) 325. 
133 See above III.2.a). 
134 Ss. 67, 123 of the Aktiengesetz and the construction thereof.
135 The European Commission, Commission Recommendation on fostering an appropriate regime 
for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (14.12.2004), 2004/913/EC, OJ L 2004 385/55. 
136 See above III.B.1., notes 61 et seq.
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Further, the European Commission issued the recommendation on directors’ 
independence137 in the belief that the presence of independent representatives on 
the board who are capable of challenging the decisions of the management may 
serve as an effective device to protect the interests of shareholders and, where 
appropriate, of other stakeholders. However, the European Commission (probably 
under the pressure of the 13 Member States, in which employees’ codetermination 
regimes are implemented138) reduced its independence requirement with respect to 
directors. Under the current recommendation, worker representatives in the boards 
are deemed independent. Presently, in German corporations with more than 2000 
employees, employee representatives account for half of the seats on the super-
visory board (but these employee representatives do not have equivalent voting 
power).139 Thus, the legislature refrained from addressing the issue of directors’ 
independence. We criticize this strategy, because the lowering of the indepen-
dence requirement has substituted for a sound discussion as to whether Europe (and 
Germany, in particular) needs the independence requirement for corporations with 
concentrated ownership at all, or whether other measures140 are more appropriate 
for these types of firms. At this point in time, we personally believe that the latter 
is the case.141
The German Codex Commission, however, responded to the independent direc-
tor debate in its 2005-Codex amendments. It did so with a soft recommendation: ”It 
shall not be the rule for the former Management Board chairman or a Management 
Board member to become Supervisory Board chairman or the chairman of a Super-
visory Board committee. If this is intended, special reasons shall be presented to 
the annual general meeting.”142 Further, “the Supervisory Board shall include what 
137 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervi-
sory directors and on the committees of the (supervisory) board (15.02.2005) 2005/162/EC, OJ L 2005 
52/51.
138 See T Baums & P Ulmer (eds), Employees’ Co-Determination in the Member States of the 
European Union (Heidelberg, Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft: 2004).
139 Under the Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976 that is applied to corporate groups with more than 
2000 workers, workers elect the half of 12, 16, or 20 supervisory board members. However, the share-
holders elect the chairman of the board whose voting power is doubled in contentious votes. Under the 
Drittelmitbestimmungsgesetz of 2004 that is applied to corporate groups with more than 500 and up 
to 2000 workers, a third of the supervisory members will be elected by workers. The oldest and most 
extensive regime under the Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1951, which essentially assigns 50% of 
the seats and the votes to worker employees, merely regards to corporations in mining industries and 
steal production (with approximately 20 firms remaining, including ThyssenKrupp AG). 
140 See the measures presented above II.1., for example Konzernrecht, transparency requirements, 
guaranteed dividends, sell-out rights, etc
141 In firms with concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders typically exercise control over 
management. Weakening controlling shareholders’ influence over management through independence 
requirements implies weakening control over management. Thus, measures need to be adopted for firms 
with concentrated ownership that merely limit controlling shareholders’ opportunities to exploit minority 
shareholders without preventing controlling shareholders from effectively monitoring management.
142 No. 5.4.4 GCGC (as amended). 
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it considers an adequate number of independent members. A Supervisory Board 
member is considered independent if he/she has no business or personal relations 
with the company or its Management Board which cause a conflict of interests. 
Not more than two form members of the Management Board shall be members of 
the Supervisory Board …”143 Thus, significant discretion is vested into German 
supervisory boards. 
In this context, it is noteworthy that three large-scale forces drive the discussion 
about worker codetermination in Germany: (1) The flexibility that the European 
Company framework144 provides; (2) The pressure that the forthcoming (?) Direc-
tives on Cross-border mergers145 and the Cross-border transfer of registered offices 
exerts on German corporate law; and (3) The conflict of interest of the employee 
representatives in supervisory boards. Codetermination is perceived to be harmful 
to the reputation of German corporate law in that in some restructuring proceedings, 
the vice-chairman of the supervisory board organized the strike against the firm. 
This is due to the fact that some union representatives on supervisory boards prefer 
to fulfil their duties as union representatives, instead of exercising their function 
as corporate fiduciaries. At the end of this discussion, we might find mandatory 
worker codetermination reduced to 1/3 of the supervisory board members.146 
V. Conclusion
We have seen that the German corporate governance legislature has been active, 
is active and will likely be active in the future. In many fields of reform, Germany 
will not require major changes since it has undertaken the most significant steps 
already. With respect to board issues, Germany was prevented from taking major 
legislative steps by the Commission’s decision to portray worker representatives as 
independent directors, though reform steps are likely to be taken on the basis of the 
national reform discussion. Finally, German substantive securities law has generally 
reached the standard of the British and North-American market rules. However, 
with respect to the disclosure of company data, the German legislature falls behind 
143 No. 5.4.2 GCGC (as amended).  
144 Above, note 32. 
145 See the Press Release by the European Commission: “Employee participation was a key issue in 
the negotiations, given the widely diverging systems in force in the Member States. This raises the ques-
tion of how to deal with cross-border mergers implying a loss or a reduction of employee participation. 
The Parliament agreed that employee participation schemes should apply to cross-border mergers where 
at least one of the merging companies is operating under an employee participation system. Employee 
participation in the newly created company will be subject to negotiations based on the model of the 
European Company Statute.”
146 Ron Gilson commented on this development that a 1/3 ratio would enable venture capitalists 
to stay in control of the firm when it grows. Thus, in addition to other (possibly positive) effects, a 
reduction of workers’ seats may support private venture capital activity in Germany.
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developments in the countries of its European partners. Thus, overall, the result is 
mixed, but there is a clear tendency in favour of reform and modernization. Return-
ing to our introduction, we hold that with respect to corporate governance, the 
judgment that Germany exhibits characteristics of the “old Europe” is unjustified.
